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ABSTRACT 
Energy security has acquired increasing importance in the Western world, 
as some energy producers are using oil and gas for political leverage. In addition, 
alongside established players, new and temporarily weak central Asian countries 
are also looking for guaranteed stability and a secure environment in order to sell 
their gas and oil on the world market, without any interruption or mandate by 
established producers.   
Guided by the enduring legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey has 
been pursuing a policy of “Peace at Home and Peace Abroad” since the very 
establishment of the new Republic in incorporating this idea into Turkey’s energy 
security policy bona fides, the country is becoming a key ally for the U.S. in the 
region. Indeed, the U.S. will need this reliable partner in the near future, since 
that energy security will be one of the main challenges for U.S. foreign policy in 
the years ahead. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines Turkey as an emerging energy hub. In particular, it 
assesses this concept as an opportunity for both the United States and Turkey 
their future allied contributions to the emerging security issue as well as regional 
and global peace.   
B. IMPORTANCE  
Energy security has acquired increasing importance in the Western world, 
as some energy producers are using oil and gas for political leverage. In addition, 
alongside established players, new and temporarily weak central Asian countries 
are also looking for guaranteed stability and a secure environment in order to sell 
their gas and oil on the world market, without any interruption or mandate by 
established producers.   
“Turkey is geographically located in close proximity to 71.8% of the world’s 
proven gas and 72.7% of oil reserves, in particular those in the Middle East and 
the Caspian basin. It thus, forms a natural energy bridge between the source 
countries and consumer markets and stands as a key country in ensuring energy 
security through diversification of supply sources and routes, considerations that 
have gained increased significance today.”1   
Guided by the enduring legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey has 
been pursuing a policy of “Peace at Home and Peace Abroad” since the very 
establishment of the new Republic in incorporating this idea into Turkey’s energy 
security policy bona fides, the country is becoming a key ally for the U.S. in the  
 
                                            
1 Commission of the Deputy Directorate General for Energy, Water and Environment of 
Turkey, Turkey’s Energy Strategy (Ankara, Turkiye: Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanligi Yayinlari, 
2008), http://www.mfa.gov.tr (accessed March 11, 2008). 
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region. Indeed, the U.S. will need this reliable partner in the near future, since 
that energy security will be one of the main challenges for U.S. foreign policy in 
the years ahead.2   
The main goal of this thesis is to evaluate the importance, advantage, and 
inevitability of this alliance based on scholar research.  The basic premise 
throughout this thesis is that Turkey, as an emerging energy hub, should expect 
to be supported in its progress based on the U.S. evaluation its own 
responsibility and rights to secure energy flow from and through the region.  
Specifically, if the U.S. is seeking alternative courses of action for its future 
operations concerning energy security, and if these alternatives do not primarily 
include military actions, the suggested partnership should bring a cost-effective 
and sustainable stability and peace to the region and to the world. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
One of the major problems regarding the future of energy security is the 
probable course of action of the United States in the next decade. Will the Middle 
East witness further armed interventions (Iran, Syria?), or will the new President 
choose a peaceful approach? The ability and willingness of Turkey to deepen 
strategic bilateral relations with the United States would play a great role in a 
peaceful approach. In this context, Moises Naim emphasizes some realities; 
 …and Erdogan (Turkish Prime Minister) are just two in a long list of 
world leaders who understand that while the United States may 
sometimes use a heavy hand, the alternatives are much worse. 
Few want to see the world’s stage led by autocratic regimes such 
as those in Russia or China. An ineffectual Europe does not offer 
much in the way of leadership. And short of these options, there are 
few possibilities besides living in an anarchic vacuum. Many foreign 
leaders will therefore be willing to pay the price that comes with 
American leadership. They ask only that the price not include  
 
 
                                            
2 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2001), 
http://web.nps.navy.mil/ (accessed March 11, 2008). 
 3
subservience to the whims of a giant with more power than brains 
and whose legitimacy is undermined by regular displays of 
incompetence, recklessness and ignorance.3 
It is not a secret that the European Union needs Turkey, but, obviously, 
there is no consensus accepting this big country into the Union. Moreover, 
Russia wants Turkey to carry only its own natural gas and oil, not any other 
future flow from the Caspian Basin on even from Central Asia.    
Another important aspect regarding the topic is the future of Iraq. Would a 
divided Iraq create more stability? What would happen if one day Northern Iraqi 
Kurds declare independence from Iraq? Soner Cagaptay claims,  
Perhaps the Kurdish Regional Government needs Turkey more 
than Turkey needs it. Even if the Iraqi Kurds were to establish 
control over Kirkuk’s vast oil reserves, they could not export this oil 
without the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, the only oil transit line 
connecting landlocked northern Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea in 
Turkey. And, assuming that the Iraqi Kurds recover their frail 
relationship with Washington, once United States pulls out of Iraq, 
will the Kurds receive ready American protection without the Incirlik 
base in Turkey? Finally, the Iraqi Kurds have much to hope for in 
terms of economic development, but will this not prove difficult 
without Turkey’s cooperation, as the only developed economy 
bordering Iraq?4 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The growing importance of the issue, “Energy Security” is directing more 
scholars from different disciplines to the topic every day. This fact is creating a 
huge amount of valuable but at the same time a complex material accumulation. 
This fact also makes it impossible to provide a universal definition acceptable by 
all disciplines. However, international relations scholars appear to be the most 
successful in providing an understandable definition. Indeed, the term “energy 
                                            
3 Naim Moises. “A Hunger for America,” The Washington Post (January 2, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ (accessed March 22, 2008). 
4 Soner Cagaptay, “Degrees from Erbil: The Iraqi Kurds Need Turkey,” The Washington Post 
(March 3, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ (accessed March 12, 2008). 
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security” has been used widely with various meanings. However, scholars and 
other writers usually describe “energy security” in the national strategic (grand 
strategy) level as the following. 
• For energy producing countries, the predictability of the demand 
and orderliness of the supply 
• For energy consuming countries, guaranteeing the supply of the 
needed energy raw materials with the proper price, place and time 
(guaranteed access/security of the supply) 
• For governments, ensuring national security interests, sustaining 
economic development and, from the perspective of meeting users’ 
needs, guaranteed access and procurement of energy resources in 
a stable market environment5 
No doubt, energy security is becoming a more and more important motive 
for international relations, and, according some scholars, is already the main 
cause of struggle in the international arena. Indeed, “the protection of critical raw 
materials and transit routes - which today means predominantly energy security - 
has, of course, been a major theme in American security policy for a very long 
time.”6  
The problem is, obviously, whether the United States will be able to 
continue to conduct its leading role in 21st century. No one can expect an isolated 
“America,” but real politics indicates some serious challenges for the United 
States. In this context, some academics are predicting “the rise of the new 
energy world order.” 
Energy of all sorts was once hugely abundant, making possible the 
worldwide economic expansion of the past six decades. This 
expansion benefited the United States above all - along with its 
"First World" allies in Europe and the Pacific. Recently, however, a 
select group of former "Third World" countries - China and India in 
particular - have sought to participate in this energy bonanza by 
industrializing their economies and selling a wide range of goods to  
 
                                            
5 Hasan Dogan, The Energy Security Case (Ankara, Turkey: Turkish General Staff, 2006). 
6 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York, NY: 
Metropolitan Books, 2001). 
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international markets. This, in turn, has led to an unprecedented 
spurt in global energy consumption - a 47% rise in the past 20 
years alone, according to the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE).7 
Taking into account reflections and results of this new harsh environment, 
many scholars share the idea that Turkey is becoming an energy hub, not simply 
an energy corridor. In this context, and as mentioned in a recent publication by 
Katinka Barysch, “Turkey’s development as an European energy hub looks 
natural, given its lucky location between countries that harbor 70 per cent of the 
world’s oil and gas reserve to its east, north and south, and one of the world’s 
biggest energy markets in the west.”8  
Alongside many other scholars, Alex Petersen also does not limit Turkey’s 
energy hub status as only a European one. According to the writer, “…the 
functional links that bind the NATO member and EU aspirant to transatlantic 
structures are being strengthened.  The most important of these functional links 
is Turkey’s growing role as an energy hub, the crossroads in the vaunted East-
West transport corridor, connecting the exporters of Central Asia, with the 
consumers of Western Europe.  The implications of this role stretch beyond mere 
energy infrastructure: not only reducing Europe’s unwise dependence on 
Russian sources, but facilitating Western integration in strategic parts of 
Eurasia.”9  
Furthermore, many scholarly authorities mention the peace-friendly nature 
of the Turkish approach to the energy security issue and the many vital U.S. 
benefits in it. Indeed, besides many other gains, Turkey as a stable energy hub 
would serve also to warm “chilling” energy-related relations between the United 
States and Russia, too. In this context, 
                                            
7 Michael T. Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Politics of Energy (New York, 
NY: Metropolitan Books, 2008). 
8 Katinka Barysch, “Turkey’s Role in European Energy Security,” Centre for European 
Reform Essays (December 2007), http://www.cer.org.uk/ (accessed February 2, 2008). 
9 Alex Petersen, “Turkey: The Transatlantic Energy Hub,” Young Professionals in Foreign 
Policy (July 22, 2007), http://www.ypfp.org/ (accessed March 13, 2008). 
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Initially, the United States and its partners, particularly Turkey, 
strongly supported energy development in both Russia and the 
Caspian states, including the creation  of multiple export routes, in 
the sure knowledge that energy security would contribute to their 
national independence. At the end, it is Russia and the Caspian 
states that are contributing increasingly to U.S. energy security, and 
its ability to depend less on OPEC states for its energy 
requirements. There is a certain beauty in this historical moment.10  
“Central Asian gas transit routes that are not controlled by Russia are 
scarce and are currently limited to the as yet unfinished Baku–Tbilisi–Erzerum 
pipeline, from Azerbaijan to Turkey, and Korpedzhe– Kurt-Kui, which is short, 
extending only from Turkmenistan to Iran.”11 Of course, in addition to these 
optimistic ideas, there are also some claims that some important problems that 
Turkey is confronting are formidable obstacles on the country’s way to becoming 
an energy hub. According to them, some structural problems within the region 
have no exemption to Turkey. These problems are briefly described by Robert 
Looney: population increases; a youth explosion, especially in the twenty-to-
twenty-four age bracket; a failure to achieve global competitiveness, diversify 
economies, and create productive jobs; a steady decline in non-petroleum 
exports; over urbanization; broad problems in integrating women effectively and 
productively into the work force; growing pressures on young men and women; 
little regional trade; increasing water scarcity; and failed or inadequate growth in 
infrastructure.12  In this sense, and alongside other international challenges, 
these problem areas are also to be tested. 
One other fact to examine are the current regional and international 
developments, particularly the new era in Turkish-U.S. relations, and their impact 
on the issue. Is a golden age of Turkish-U.S. relations beginning only now? On 
                                            
10 Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy 
Strategy (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University 2005). 
11 Ariel Cohen, “U.S. Interests and Central Asia Energy Security,” The Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder 1984, (2006): 5. 
12 Robert E. Looney, “U.S. Middle East Economic Policy: The Use of Free Trade Areas in the 
War on Terrorism,” Mediterranean Quarterly 3 (2005): 108. 
 7
the other hand, were all these high-level visits in late 2007 and in the beginning 
of 2008, support and cooperation in the war on PKK terror and other important-
looking improvements in bi-lateral relations only illusions, or, worse, only 
preparations for an Iran campaign? In this context, the fresh statements of the 
Turkish President Abdullah Gul are important: "Our relations with the United 
States have an importance that goes beyond our relations with any other country. 
The United States is not [just] any ally for us; it is the most important ally.”13 In 
addition, some U.S. “think-tank” institutions have begun to emphasize the 
necessity that U.S.–Turkey relations require a new emphasis on energy security. 
In this regard, the recent press release by the Atlantic Council mentions that “the 
United States should expand its new emphasis on Turkey as an energy partner 
to include Turkey in more transatlantic efforts to fight global terrorism and to build 
stability in the broader Middle East.”14  
Furthermore, a recently published report of the U.S. Army Strategic 
Studies Institute also emphasizes that one the three pillars of the new era in the 
Turkish-U.S. bilateral relations should be an energy security alliance: “The U.S.-
Turkey partnership must be rebuilt. A stronger partnership will relieve the 
isolation that leads Turkey to defend its interests so intently within NATO. A 
stronger partnership will also benefit the United States—Turkey, along with most 
of its neighborhood, is of vital importance to U.S. national security. In many ways, 
Turkey is now more important to the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives 
than it was during the Cold War. Turkey could play an especially vital role in 
three areas: enhancing energy security; restraining Islamic radicalism and 
terrorism; and stabilizing the wider Middle East region.”15 
                                            
13 Abdullah Gul, “Press Release,” Press Bulletin of the Office of the President of the 
Turkish Republic,” (January 2008), http://www.cankaya.gov.tr/ (accessed April 23, 2008). 
14 Nicholas Burns, “The Future of the U.S.-Turkey Relationship,” The Atlantic Council Press 
Release (September 13, 2007), http://www.acus.org/ (accessed March 12, 2008). 
15 Frances G. Burwell, The Evolution of Turkish-U.S. Relations in a Transatlantic Context: 
Colloquium Report (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2008), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil (accessed May 30, 2008).  
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The NATO front is also concerned with energy security problems. The 
Alliance perceives energy as a security issue. Although most European allies 
believe that a market solution exists to ensure the security of energy supplies, 
NATO has begun to discuss the issue as an allied concern. A political role in 
energy security for NATO seems most likely in the near future.16 Turkey, which is 
a long-time NATO member with important commitments, would be an 
indispensable vanguard player for the Alliance. Furthermore, one of the important 
disagreement areas, the questioning of Turkey’s further membership in NATO,   
must also be examined in the light of the emerging energy security concerns.  
Also, regarding NATO, Russia’s new dangerous energy-based policies 
needs to be evaluated. Indeed, the developments following the Russian 
Federation’s cutting off the gas supply to Ukraine in January 2006, created 
effects that led to the increase of the importance and priority of energy security 
on the global agenda. This political maneuver of the Russian Federation did not 
only create a deterrent effect on Ukraine, but also led other European countries 
and the European Union, which are highly dependent on Russia for energy 
imports, to assess that the possibility of Russia putting into practice similar 
maneuvers over the European Union poses a strategic risk. The individual 
measurements such as bilateral gas agreements taken by NATO and/or EU 
members endanger the benefits of these alliances. In this respect, Turkey’s 
expected contributions as a partner/or member would guarantee the survival of 
the solidarity of these intuitions.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines the fact that Turkey is becoming an energy hub as a 
case study. In particular, a number of scenarios will be developed tracing the 
logical consequences of alternative energy alliances such as between Turkey 
and the U.S., Turkey and the EU, and Turkey and Russia. In this context, the 
                                            
16 Paul Gallis, “NATO and Energy Security,” Congressional Research Service Report 
RS22409 (2007), http://www.fas.org/ (accessed March 09, 2008).  
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study will argue that the best option for Turkey, the U.S., the region, and the 
world is the first one. The study will also discuss other probable future 
developments and their effects on the issue.  
These studies will draw on scholarly sources, as well as those others 
working in the area of energy security. It will also use explanations by related 
countries’ officials, predominantly people from the U.S., Turkey, the EU, Russia, 
Iran, China, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the author’s thoughts formed 
while serving as an energy security working group action officer on the Turkish 
General Staff will be important sources for these arguments. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Because of its wide and diversified definitions, the strategically minded 
meaning of the term energy security will be explained within its historical 
background. In this context, U.S. energy security doctrines will be examined. 
Then, the current U.S., Turkish energy, and energy security strategies will be 
compared.  After this, the neighboring regions (The Middle East, Southeast 
Europe, and Caucasus) of Turkey will be evaluated in respect of the topic. In this 
context, the probable opportunities (diverse strategic alliances, cooperation 
fields) and threats and their consequences will be examined. As conclusion, the 
answer to the question will be tried to be given: Is the best option for U.S., 
Turkey, region, and world, a new multidimensional U.S.-Turkish energy alliance? 
If yes, why and how?  
 10
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II. TURKEY’S ENERGY STRATEGY, CURRENT AND FUTURE 
PROJECTS, AND CHALLENGES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Turkey has a unique geographical location. It is in close proximity to 72% 
of the world’s proven gas reserves and 73% of its oil reserves, in particular those 
in the Middle East and the Caspian basin. The Caspian basin’s oil reserves only, 
are at least at 17 to 33 billion barrels. By 2010, countries in the Caspian basin 
could produce 2.5 to 6 million barrels of oil per day, exceeding Venezuela’s 
production. Moreover, the Caspian basin is also home to an estimated 232 trillion 
cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves, which is comparable in size to 
Saudi Arabia’s reserves. The region’s natural gas production in 2003 was 
approximately 4.5 Tcf, which was comparable to the combined production of 
South America, Central America, and Mexico.17 In addition to the well-known 
energy sources-rich Middle East region, the Caspian basin’s growing share of the 
world energy market gives Turkey more and more importance, concerning 
regional and global energy security.  
Turkey forms a natural energy bridge between the source countries and 
consumer markets and stands as a key to ensuring energy security through 
diversification of supply sources and routes of delivery. These are considerations 
that have gained increased significance for neighboring energy markets including 
Europe today.  
In short, Turkey has established or considered a number of pipeline 
projects that could transport oil into Turkey without relying on the crowded 
Bosporus Straits. 
                                            
17 Karen Harbert, “Remarks at the 25th Annual Conference on U.S.-Turkish Relations,” 
(March 27, 2006), http://www.pi.energy.gov/library.html (accessed October 6, 2008). 
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B. MAIN ENERGY TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE ARTERIES 
AND IMPORTANT PROJECTS 
Major pipeline projects, realized and under construction, will inevitably 
contribute to Europe’s energy supply security. These projects are enhancing 
Turkey’s role as an important transit country on the Eurasia energy axis and 
energy hub in the region. To this end, Turkey has concentrated its efforts for the 
transportation of Caspian oil and gas reserves to Western markets at the 
realization of the East-West Energy Corridor, often referred to as the Silk Road of 
the 21st century. The pipeline projects linking the Caucasus and Central Asia to 
Europe will be essential for the region’s integration with the West. Secure and 
commercially profitable pipelines will help bring stability and prosperity to the 
region.  
 
Figure 1.   Major Pipeline Projects in, from, and to Turkey18 
                                            
18 Hasan Dogan, The Energy Security Case (Ankara, Turkey: Turkish General Staff, 2006). 
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1. Nabucco Project 
The Nabucco project represents a new gas pipeline connecting the 
Caspian region, Middle East and Egypt via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Hungary with Austria and further on with the Central and Western European gas 
markets.19 
The pipeline length is approximately 3,300 Kilometers, starting at 
the Georgian/Turkish and/or Iranian/Turkish border respectively, 
leading to Baumgarten in Austria. In this respect it must be taken 
into account that a reasonable amount of the gas volumes, upon 
reaching Baumgarten have to be further transported through 
Austria to the Central and Western European Countries.20 
According to market studies, the pipeline has been designed to transport a 
maximum amount of 31 bcm/y. The Nabucco project is included in the EU Trans-
European Energy Network program and a feasibility study for the Nabucco 
pipeline has been performed under a EU project grant. Construction of pipeline is 
expected to begin in 2010 and is planned to be finished in 2013. It is estimated to 
cost around €7.9 billion. The company leading the project is OMV from Austria.21 
Nabucco pipeline highlights Turkey's strategic importance to the EU. The 
U.S.-backed Nabucco pipeline project increased Turkey's strategic importance to 
the EU, and two key opponents of Turkey's EU membership, France and Austria, 
are softening their objections to the ongoing accession talks. Nabucco is at the 
centre of Europe's efforts to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas.  
                                            
19 Ariel Cohen, U.S. “Interests and Central Asia Energy Security,” Backgrounder by Heritage 
Foundation 1984, November 15, 2006, 2. 
20 Ibid., 3. 
21 Energy Security: Cause for Cooperation or Competition? Senator Richard Lugar, The 




Figure 2.   The Nabucco Project22 
2. Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline 
The central component of the East-West Energy Corridor is the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which is a dedicated crude oil pipeline system that 
extends from the Azeri-Chirag-Deepwater Gunashli (ACG) field through 
Azerbaijan and Georgia to a terminal at Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast of 
Turkey, bypassing the environmentally sensitive Black Sea and the Turkish 
Straits. 
This is one of those turning points in history," says Mike Bilbo, 
director of communications and external affairs for BP in Turkey. "It 
changed the picture for Turkey overnight." By his reckoning, 
existing shipping arrangements through the Bosporus Straits plus 
the new pipeline mean that 5% of the world's oil now traverses 
Turkey.23 
 
                                            
22 Necdet Pamir, “Energy in Security and the Most Recent Lesson: The Russia - Ukraine 
Gas Crisis,” Center for Eurasian Strategis Studies (ASAM), Ankara, Turkey, April 21, 2008, 
www.asam.org.tr/temp/temp111.doc (accessed May 21, 2008). 
23 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources\Statistics, 
http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=en&sf=webpages&b=yapimasamasi&bn=&hn=&id=4833 
(accessed November 21, 2008). 
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The pipeline can transport up to 1 million barrels per day (approximately 
1.5% of the world’s oil supply), and at 1760 kilometers is the second longest of its 
kind in the world. The first cargo of oil, which had traveled through the BTC 
pipeline to Ceyhan, was loaded onto a tanker on June 4, 2006.24  
On June 16, 2006, Kazakhstan officially joined the BTC oil-pipeline 
project. A Host Government Agreement to that effect was signed on that day in 
Almaty by the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, İlham Aliyev and 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, respectively. Under the agreement, Kazakh crude oil will 
be shipped to Baku across the Caspian Sea, and then pumped through the BTC 
pipeline to Ceyhan. A grand ceremony to mark the official inauguration of the 
BTC pipeline was held in Turkey on July 13, 2006 and as of February 8, 2008, 
the 374th cargo had been lifted at the Ceyhan Terminal.25 
 
 
Figure 3.   BTC Pipeline26 
At the forefront of this effort is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline, the 
first direct pipeline to deliver crude oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean 
without crossing Russian soil or passing through the Bosporus or Turkish Straits. 
                                            
24 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources\Statistics, 
http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=en&sf=webpages&b=yapimasamasi&bn=&hn=&id=4833 
(accessed November 21, 2008). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Necdet Pamir. “Energy in Security and the Most Recent Lesson: The Russia - Ukraine 
Gas Crisis,” Center for Eurasian Strategis Studies (ASAM), Ankara, Turkey, April 21, 2008, 
www.asam.org.tr/temp/temp111.doc (accessed May 21, 2008). 
 16
The 1,100-mile pipeline cost nearly $4 billion to build, and is operated by a BP-
led consortium of 11 national and international oil companies.27 “In May 2005, 
Azerbaijan began test filling the Azeri section of the pipeline, and on July 13, 
2006, the first tanker at the Turkish port of Ceyhan was filled with oil from 
BTC.”28 The line is estimated to have a peak capacity of more than one million 
bbl/d, and Turkey is expected to earn between $140 and $200 million per year in 
transit and operating fees from the project.29 
The construction of the BTC Pipeline was carried out by an integrated 
project team that simultaneously led the construction of the Southern Caucasus 
Pipeline (SPC), which will transport natural gas parallel to the BTC for most of its 
route before connecting to the Turkish gas pipeline network near the town of 
Horasan.30 The BTC Pipeline passes a considerable distance through rugged 
terrain, reaching an elevation of more than 9,000 feet when traversing the 
Caucasus Mountains. Security was a key factor considered in the design of the 
BTC Pipeline, with the entire length of the line buried to help protect against 
possible sabotage.31 
3. Seeking Alternatives for the Turkish Straits 
From the energy security perspective, the Turkish Straits are of particular 
importance as around 3.7% of the world’s daily oil consumption is shipped  
 
 
                                            
27 BTC Project, International Finance Corporation World Bank Group, http://www.ifc.org/btc 
(accessed September 12, 2008). 
28 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources\Statistics, 
http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=en&sf=webpages&b=yapimasamasi&bn=&hn=&id=4833 
(accessed November 21, 2008). 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Pipelines, Politics and Power,” Centre for European Reform Publications, (February 
2008), http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/rp_851.pdf (accessed May 19, 2008). 
31 Turkey: Implications of a Blast on the BTC Pipeline Stratfor Analysis, 
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through the Turkish Straits. The amount of oil and oil products transported 
through the Strait of İstanbul has increased dramatically from 60 million tons in 
1996 to 145.4 million tons in 2007.32 
In 1979 and in 1994, tanker crashes in the Bosphorus claimed 41 and 28 
deaths, respectively, and officials have long warned that the increase in maritime 
traffic, coupled with the growing size of the tankers and of Istanbul’s population, 
make for a disaster waiting happen. A tanker explosion in the Bosphorus, would 
result in a human and environmental disaster of immense proportions. Turkish 
Coast Guard figures show that in 2003, 46,930 vessels crossed the straits, more 
than 8,000 of them laden with dangerous cargo, mostly oil or liquid petroleum 
gas. The estimated figure for this year is 53,000 ships, some of them carrying 
petroleum products totaling 144 million tons, most of them aboard Russian 
tankers. This figure is expected to reach around 190-200 million tons in 2009 due 
to the expected throughput from the Caspian Sea reaching the Black Sea in 
addition to the large amounts of Russian oil. In view of the heavy tanker traffic, as 
well as the physical characteristics and peculiarities of the Turkish Straits, a 
maritime disaster caused by a tanker carrying hazardous cargo seems inevitable 
sooner or later. In addition to the humanitarian and environmental perils, such a 
disaster would interrupt the regular flow of oil to world markets. The solution lies 
at the use of alternative oil export options that by-pass the Straits.33 
Energy companies are aware of the seriousness of the situation and they 
recognize that there is a limit to the amount of oil that can be transported through 





                                            
32 Turkey’s Energy Security, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/european_energy_policy/turkeys_energy_strategy_en.pdf 
(accessed October 30, 2008). 
33 Turkish Coast Guard Annual Report, 2008. 
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adopted in December 2000 by the Governments of the U.S. and the UK as well 
as companies such as Chevron, Texaco, Conoco, Shell and BP and several 
NGOs.34  
The 17-mile long Turkish Straits, only a half mile wide at its narrowest 
point, is one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. The straits are also 
increasingly an important oil transit point, with oil tankers bringing shipments from 
the Black Sea to the Mediterranean for export.  
The Turkish government has raised concerns that increased oil 
tanker traffic through the narrow and twisting Bosporus heightens 
the risk of an oil spill. Exports through the Bosporus have grown 
substantially since the breakup of the former Soviet Union. One 
project that will increase oil transit through the Bosporus is the 
Russian-backed Northern Route Export Pipeline, a 990-mile 
pipeline that transports oil from Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea area oil 
deposits to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The 
pipeline, built by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), delivered 
up to 650,000 bbl/d of oil by year-end 2006. After reaching 
Novorossiysk, oil for export is then loaded onto tankers and 
shipped through the Bosporus onto world markets. To ease 
increasing oil traffic through the Bosporus Straits, a number of 
Bosporus bypass options are under consideration in southeastern 
Europe and Turkey itself. The BTC Pipeline is the first of several 
bypass projects under consideration over the last decade to have 
materialized.35 
4. Trans-Anatolian (Samsun-Ceyhan) By-Pass Oil Pipeline 
Another project currently under consideration is the Samsun-Ceyhan 
bypass, which would transport oil from Turkey’s Black Sea port of Samsun to 
Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast. Turkey’s Council of Ministers gave initial 
approval to the construction of the planned 350-mile, one million bbl/d line in May 
2006. The project is being developed by a 50-50 joint venture between Italy’s Eni 
and Turkey’s Calik Energy, called the Trans-Anadolu Pipeline Company 
                                            
34 Sinan Ogan, “Turkish Straits,” Turkish Centre for International Relations &Strategic 
Analysis TUSAM, http://www.turksam.org/en/a195.html (accessed December 1, 2008). 
35 Ibid. 
 19
(TAPPCO), which as of September 2006 holds the only Turkish government 
license to develop a Bosporus bypass project. Eni holds an 18.5% interest in the 
Kashagan oil field in the Kazakh section of the Caspian Sea, which would likely 
be a primary source for the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline.36 
 
 
Figure 4.   Trans-Anatolian By-pass Oil Pipeline37 
Among the various by-pass proposals, the Turkish Government has 
decided to support the Trans Anatolian (Samsun-Ceyhan) By-pass Oil Pipeline. 
The advantages of the project over its alternatives can be summarized as 
follows. 
• The proximity of Samsun to the oil outlets on the Eastern Black Sea 
will minimize the seaborne transportation of oil on the Black Sea 
• The existing energy infrastructure in Ceyhan obviates the need for 
undertaking new and costly infrastructure investments 
• It constitutes the most environmentally manageable by-pass option 
The ground-breaking ceremony of the Trans Anatolian Pipeline was held 
on April 24, 2007 in Ceyhan.38  
                                            
36 Nilgun S. Acikalin, “Energy Corridor: Turkey,” International Energy Agency Roundtable on 
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37 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources\Statistics, 
http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=en&sf=webpages&b=yapimasamasi&bn=&hn=&id=4833 
(accessed November 21, 2008). 
38 Nilgun S. Acikalin, “Energy Corridor: Turkey,” International Energy Agency Roundtable on 
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(accessed September 21, 2008). 
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5. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) Natural Gas Pipeline 
The second component of the East-West Energy Corridor, namely the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) Natural Gas Pipeline, became operational on July 3, 
2007. Designed to transport natural gas from the Shah Deniz field in the 
Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea, through Georgia and on to the Georgia-
Turkey border, it is expected that the pipeline will export 6,6 billion cubic metres a 
year. It is also considered as the first leg of the Trans-Caspian Natural Gas 
Pipeline Project which will tap into the world’s 4th largest natural gas reserves 
located in Turkmenistan and those in Kazakhstan. The Trans-Caspian Natural 
Gas Project is of particular urgency as it will contribute to the further 
diversification of routes and resources. From the supply security perspective, it is 
also of importance that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan not become dependent on 
any one country or any one route for exporting their natural gas and oil to 
western markets.  
 
Figure 5.   BTE Natural Gas Pipeline39 
                                            
39 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources\Statistics, 
http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=en&sf=webpages&b=yapimasamasi&bn=&hn=&id=4833 
(accessed November 21, 2008). 
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6. Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline 
The Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline is Iraq's largest crude oil export line. Turkey’s 
port of Ceyhan is also the destination for oil exports from northern Iraq on the 
Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The 600-mile dual pipeline consists of two parallel 
lines that have a maximum throughput of around 1.6 Mmbbl/d.40 However, 
Kirkuk-Ceyhan has been a major target for sabotage since June 2003, and is 
only open sporadically. Both lines have often been closed down after being 
severely damaged in sabotage attacks by PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) Terror 
organization.41 The terrorist attack challenge against these pipelines will be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 6.   The Position of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline42 
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7. Other Important Projects 
The transportation of Caspian oil and natural gas resources via multiple 
pipelines to Europe through such projects as the interconnection of the gas 
pipeline networks of Turkey, Greece and Italy within the Southern Europe Gas 
Ring Project will also constitute an essential component of Europe’s energy 
diversification efforts.43  
The incorporation of Turkey’s energy network with that of the EU was 
realized with the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Turkey-
Greece Interconnector signed in February 2003 and the Sale and Purchase 
Agreement between BOTAŞ and DEPA in December 2003. The trilateral 
Intergovernmental Agreement for the Turkey-Italy-Greece Interconnector was 
signed in Rome on July 26, 2007. In the plateau period, the volume of gas to be 
transported via Turkey is expected to reach 3 bcm and 8 bcm for Greece and 
Italy, respectively.44  
Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan met with Greek Prime Minister 
Karamanlis on 3 July 2005 at Ipsala on the Turkish-Greek border 
for the ground breaking ceremony of the joint natural gas pipeline 
construction project. The Turkey-Greece Interconnector became 
operational as of 18 November 2007, following the inauguration 
ceremony held in Ipsala with the participation of Prime Ministers of 
both countries. Efforts are also underway to construct the Nabucco 
Natural Gas Pipeline project which envisages the transportation of 
natural gas via Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to 
Austria. Former Dutch Foreign Minister, H.E. Jozias van Aartsen, 
has been assigned as the EU Coordinator for the Nabucco Project. 
Full construction and operation of the Arab Natural Gas Pipeline to 
carry Egyptian gas to Turkey via Jordan and Syria is scheduled for 
2009.45 
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Turkey is also interested in the development of Iraqi natural gas reserves. 
Iraqi natural gas could easily be connected to the Turkish national grid through a 
pipeline to be constructed parallel to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline using the 
right of way of the latter. Within this framework, a Memorandum of Understanding 
was signed between Turkey and Iraq on August 7, 2007 in Ankara in order to 
supply Iraqi natural gas to Turkey and via Turkey to Europe.46  
The extension of the Blue Stream Gas Pipeline to Ceyhan and hence to 
Ashkelon with a view to supplying Israel with Russian natural gas is also under 
consideration. Turkey continues to import natural gas from Iran through the 
existing natural gas pipeline, which has a capacity of 10 billion m
3
/y. Moreover, a 
Memorandum of Understanding related to cooperation in the fields of oil and gas 
was signed between Turkey and Iran in Ankara on July 14, 2007. Technical 
discussions continue among the relevant authorities. Turkey’s objective is to 
become Europe’s fourth main artery of energy supply following Norway, Russia 
and Algeria through the realization of these projects. This will open up a new 
avenue for cooperation between Turkey and the EU that will also reinforce 
Europe’s ties to Asia.47 
Moreover, through the completion of the projects cited above and more, it 
is anticipated that 6 to 7% of global oil supply will transit Turkey by 2012 and that 
Ceyhan will become a major energy hub and the largest oil outlet terminal in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. The Ceyhan Terminal has already been designed to 
receive the crude oil reaching Ceyhan from Kirkuk, Baku and Samsun. One of 
the many advantages of the Ceyhan Terminal is the existence of an established 
and state-of-the art infrastructure that allows for loading biggest tankers 
throughout the year.48 
                                            
46 “Iraqi Gas for Turkey,” The New Anatolian, August 9, 2007. 
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These developments attest to the strategic role Turkey will increasingly 
assume as a major transit energy highway between the world’s economic centers 
and sources of energy. In this context, President Abdullah Gul’s statements at 
the Baku Energy Summit held on November 14, 2008 emphasizes the 
importance of the projects mentioned in this chapter:  
Nowadays, the concept of "energy supply security" which is 
gradually gaining importance, is often being associated with 
“foreign policy,” “national security,” “economic welfare” and “global 
stability.” Meanwhile, energy security also compels the energy 
producer, consumer and transit countries to adopt a cooperative 
approach amongst them. This is a situation of interdependency. 
Therefore, with respect to some significant regional energy 
projects, we have to embrace an approach based on cooperation 
and mutual trust. With such projects, as it was the case with Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan, we have to transform our interdependency into a 
productive cooperation, which would bring together regional 
powers, big companies and players. I strongly believe that regional 
cooperation in the field of energy, beyond addressing the energy 
supply security, will make significant contributions to the regional 
stability, peace and prosperity. The crisis which broke out last 
August in Georgia confirmed that the unsolved conflicts in the 
region constitute a major threat from the perspectives of security 
and stability in the South Caucasus. We see that these conflicts 
represent a difficulty which should be overcome also in terms 
energy security. Undoubtly, the secure transport of Caspian energy 
sources to European markets is linked to the continuity of regional 
stability and establishment of good neighbourly relations in the 
region. We believe that the existing problems can be solved 
through establishing mutual trust among the peoples who for 
centuries have been living together a common life in the South 
Caucasus. With such an understanding, among other issues, the 
necessary conditions to deepen and expand the existing 
cooperation in the field of energy, may also be established. Our 
proposal related to the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation 
Platform, which we brought up again last August, is in fact a result 
of this understanding. Our ideal is to transform the South Caucasus 
from a geography remembered for its conflicts and disagreements 
into a region which would set an example to the world with its 
common understanding and solidarity. Our ideal is the 
transformation of the South Caucasus into a region which would 
greatly contribute to Europe’s energy security and whose name 
would be mentioned together with welfare, stability and peace, 
through the expansion and development of the productive 
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cooperation started in the field of energy. With the belief that the 
region harbors the necessary potential to reach this objective, we 
are determined to pursue our endeavours with the neighbour 
countries. Turkey’s energy strategy is multi-dimensional. Our main 
policy objectives are diversification of sources and routes as well as 
of our energy mix and to contribute to Europe's energy security. 
The Middle East and the Caspian Basin being the foremost 
examples, Turkey is located in a region where almost two thirds of 
world's proven gas and oil reserves lie. Moreover, given the fact 
that the countries in Caucasia and Central Asia, to achieve 
economic welfare, need to exploit their energy resources in the 
most rational manner as they also need those resources to be 
transported to the Western markets, Turkey, together with 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and the U.S., developed the idea of the East-
West Energy Corridor concept. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil 
Pipeline (BTC) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline 
are the two main components of the East-West Energy Corridor. As 
of 10 November 2008, more than 480 million barrels of oil has been 
carried through the BTC pipeline to the consumer countries. 
Kazakhstan has participated in the said pipeline in 2006 and for the 
first time, Kazakh oil has been transported to Baku by tankers and 
then to the world markets through this pipeline early this month. We 
deem this as a significant development. The BTE natural gas 
pipeline, the second component of the East-West Energy Corridor, 
has become operational as of July 2007. The Turkish National 
Petroleum Company TPAO, which also participates in “upstream” 
projects along the BTC and BTE, has invested more than 3 billion 
dollars in the Caspian region. In terms of the North-South Axis, in 
cooperation with Russia and Italy, Turkey has developed the Blue 
Stream Project, launched in 2003. Following the implementation of 
the BTC and BTE projects, the Southern Gas Corridor has been 
placed at the top of our agenda. Within the framework of this 
corridor, the NABUCCO, Turkey-Greece-Italy and the Trans-
Adriatic natural gas pipelines are being developed. The Turkey-
Greece Interconnector, the first leg of the Turkey-Greece-Italy 
Natural Gas Pipeline has become operational in 2007. For the first 
time, the Azeri gas has been carried to Europe through Turkey by 
way of implementation of the said project. In line with our objective 
to connect the Turkish energy grid with Europe, this project bears 
great importance. For moving gas further towards Austria over 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, technical and legal studies are 
also underway to realize the Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline Project. 
The Turkish Government has the necessary determination and the 
political will for the realization of this project. Above all, the success 
of the Nabucco project depends on the gas supply. In this respect, 
 26
we are in close contact with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. We are 
of the opinion that in the years to come, Uzbek gas can also be 
carried to Europe through the Southern Corridor. I hope that one 
day we will be able to transport natural gas from the East shore of 
the Caspian Sea to its West shore the same way the Kazakh oil 
has been carried through BTC. On the other hand, we continue to 
be in contact with the Iraqi Government with a view to enabling the 
Iraqi gas to be connected to the Turkish grid and the Southern 
Corridor by a pipeline to be constructed in South-North axis. 
Important steps were taken with respect to the realization of the 
Egypt-Syria-Turkey pipeline. Once in the future we have the 
suitable international political environment, I hope that the Iranian 
gas will be taken on board as well. While transporting the energy 
sources from producer to the consumer countries, the environment 
and the other social assets shall be given utmost care. The 
drawbacks of transporting the Caspian Basin energy resources 
through the Turkish Straits and the increasing tanker traffic as well 
as the consequences on environmental and human security are 
well known. Taking into account the situation in the Turkish Straits, 
our country is pursuing work related to projects which would 
present additional alternatives. To lighten the traffic in the Straits, 
we attach importance to the realization of the Samsun-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline. The realization of this pipeline is as important for 
environmental and human security as it is for the strengthening of 
the North-South Corridor. Consequently, as I have stressed at the 
beginning of my speech, Turkey wishes to transform the 
interdependency in the field of energy into a productive cooperation 
among the regional countries. I am totally convinced that beyond 
our energy needs, in the years to come we will gradually contribute 
more to the energy security of European countries. In this respect 
we will continue our endeavours in cooperation with all our 
neighbours, friends and partners. I hope that the Baku Energy 
Summit will give impetus to our endeavours.49 
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C. MAIN CHALLENGES FOR THE ENERGY TRANSPORTATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE OF TURKEY 
1. Pipelines: Sitting Ducks as Targets 
In the wake of the conflict in Georgia, the future of energy transportation 
from the Caspian basin and Central Asia to world markets is once again a 
concern. By looking at the attack by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) on the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline in August 2008, it is worth discussing how 
growing instability in the region highlights the interconnectedness for Turkey of 
the security of energy pipelines, terrorism and regional stability. 
Given the political, military and economic implications of oil and 
natural gas production and transportation, one can better 
appreciate the search, on the part of producers, investors and 
consumers, for cheaper and more secure energy transportation 
routes. Even a seemingly technical decision over the optimal 
transportation lines is shaped by political competition. The rivalry is 
present at all stages of energy transportation including project 
development, construction and management. Such struggles range 
from securing investment capital to sharing profits, providing 
physical security, and ensuring political stability in the countries 
involved. Today, in addition to their high economic value, energy 
pipelines play important roles in diplomatic, economic, military and 
ecological terms. In addition to offering immediate economic 
benefits to transit and terminal countries, pipelines may act as the 
building blocks of alliances and boost cooperation among states. 
Likewise, pipelines may shape domestic politics in countries that 
are increasingly dependent on imported energy for heating or 
power.50 
One strategy that appeals to countries situated astride alternative pipeline 
routes is to engage in activities designed to undermine the profitability of rival 
existing routes and render them risky for investors. Since investors will be  
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discouraged from financing projects in volatile and insecure regions, destabilizing 
rival routes by sponsoring terrorist or insurgent organizations that operate in the 
transit corridors is a common strategy.51 
Terrorist groups around the world often attack energy pipelines and the 
personnel working there. “Through acts of sabotage, bombing and kidnapping, 
terrorist or insurgent groups may seek to derail the construction of pipelines or 
the flow of oil or gas. Such attacks have occurred in many countries, including 
Colombia, Nigeria, Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.”52 Likewise, during 
the last 25 years, the PKK has threatened the security of pipelines running 
through Turkish territory and from time to time has mounted actual attacks on 
them. 
Various reasons explain why pipelines are targeted by terror 
organizations and their sponsors. First, the direct and indirect 
impact of pipelines on society makes them highly valuable targets. 
The effects of attacks range from the interruption of heating in 
winter conditions to environmental disasters, fluctuations in world 
energy markets, and diplomatic and legal disputes over 
compensation. These repercussions empower terrorist 
organizations in terms of bargaining power and propaganda 
purposes. Second, because securing infrastructure is extremely 
difficult, the physical vulnerability of pipelines and related facilities 
make them easy targets. Given the availability of explosives, 
blowing up pipelines can be accomplished by terrorists easily, 
further complicating security. Third, since petroleum and natural 
gas can easily ignite, terrorists prefer to attack them with 
explosives. Despite many safeguards developed to reduce the 
impact of sabotage acts and resume the operation of pipelines 
through quick repairs, overall pipelines are still considered 
vulnerable targets.53 
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2. The PKK and Kirkuk-Yumurtalik Pipeline 
Turkey currently has two strategically important trans-border pipelines, 
aside from the ones serving domestic needs: Kirkuk-Yumurtalik and Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan. When the Nabucco pipeline project is finalized it will connect the Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum (Turkey) and the Tabriz (Iran)-Erzurum gas pipelines to Austria, 
feeding extensive European gas networks. During the deliberations over the 
selection of these projects, their implementation, and the administration of 
pipelines, multinational companies had to factor the instability caused by the 
PKK’s terror campaign into their calculations, making the PKK an indirect player 
in the game.54 
Turkey completed the construction of the first strategic oil pipeline, Kirkuk-
Yumurtalik, between 1978 and 1984. The center of gravity of the Iran-Iraq war 
shifted from the Persian Gulf to northern Iraq in 1984. Having benefited 
enormously from oil revenues in financing the war, Iraq negotiated with Turkey to 
build a parallel line. To undermine the feasibility of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, 
Iran supported a Kurdish sabotage force in Northern Iraq and the PKK in Turkey. 
Coincidentally, the PKK initiated its terror campaign around the same time.55  
3. The PKK and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline 
The new political geography of the Caucasus and Central Asia following 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a power struggle between Russia, Iran 
and Turkey. More importantly, the growing demand for energy worldwide directed 
the attention of the developed countries seeking to diversify their suppliers to the  
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vast energy resources in these regions. “The discussions concerning the 
transportation of Azerbaijan’s energy resources to the world markets brought 
Turkey to the forefront, agitating Iran and Russia.”56 
The BTC route emerged as the most efficient option for the transportation 
of Azeri gas and oil to the West. It was eventually expected to be expanded to 
carry the rest of the Caspian basin resources.  
Since the lynchpin of these developments was the transportation of 
Azeri and Caspian resources to the West in circumvention of 
Russian-controlled lines, preventing or delaying the BTC project 
was in the interests of Russia, Iran and Armenia. Russia was 
concerned about losing its influence in the region and being left 
outside the calculations concerning the Caspian region. Iran was 
worried that oil revenues might boost Azerbaijan’s power and 
increase separatist sentiments among Azeris in Iran. Armenia was 
naturally irked by the close relations between Azerbaijan and 
Turkey and by the likely increase in Azerbaijan’s power.57 
The strategy of Russia, Iran and Armenia was based on portraying the 
BTC corridor as risky and unstable. Through acts of omission and commission 
they contributed to this perception in the 1990s. Armenia’s conflict with 
Azerbaijan in 1993 and its invasion and ongoing occupation of Nagorno-
Karabakh played a role in perpetuating instability in the Caucasus. Russia’s 
support for Armenia and meddling in the domestic affairs of Azerbaijan and 
Georgia in 1992-1993 prompted instability in these countries. The escalating 
PKK violence inside Turkey raised questions about the safety of the 
transportation corridor, further delaying the project.58 
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During the debates on the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TSK – Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri) came close to eliminating the PKK through 
a cross-border operation in northern Iraq in September 1992. The PKK had to 
relocate to camps in Zeli in northern Iraq, far from the Turkish border. The 
deteriorating conditions forced PKK terror organization leader Abdullah Ocalan to 
declare a unilateral ceasefire in March 1993. In May 1993, during his visit to 
Turkey, the Azerbaijani prime minister signed the contract for the construction of 
the pipeline. In the intervening period, the PKK maintained close ties with Iran 
and Russia. On May 24, 1993, the PKK resumed violence, ambushing a military 
convoy on the Elazig-Bingol highway, killing 33 recruits discharged from their 
duties. As the TSK intensified its counter-terrorism operations, the conflict 
escalated. Consequently, growing instability in the energy corridor forced 
investors to suspend the project.59 
Around the same time, Russia and Iran stepped up their efforts to sell 
Turkey their natural gas. The Blue Stream pipeline (a trans-Black Sea natural 
gas pipeline supplying Russian gas to Turkey) that increasingly rendered Turkey 
dependent on Russian gas was initiated under these conditions. Turkey also 
signed a contract with Iran for the construction of a pipeline to carry Iranian gas 
to Turkey. The resumption of the BTC project came only in the early 2000s, after 
Turkey expended enormous resources to capture Ocalan and bring PKK violence 
under control.60 
4. New Russian Security and Foreign Policy Doctrine 
Russian foreign and security policies in the Putin era were centered on a 
new doctrine that sought to channel energy revenues to the realization of 
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Russia’s strategic priorities.61 “The sustainability of this approach depends on the 
maintenance of Russia’s influence over ex-Soviet countries, and the continuation 
of the West’s dependence on hydrocarbons and continuing high energy prices.”62 
Russia’s interest in the production, marketing and transportation of 
oil and natural gas is particularly visible in the case of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, hence in its policies as well toward 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Anxious to diversify energy supply 
routes and break down Russia’s dominance, the United States and 
the European countries have grown increasingly interested in the 
BTC as well as other routes through Turkey. Although, the BTC and 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline are buried underground, 
concerns over their security have never fully disappeared.63  
In this context, the recent conflict in Georgia has refocused attention on 
energy security in the Caucasus. Coincidentally, prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities in Georgia, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline came under attack on 
August 5, 2008, disrupting oil transportation for 14 days. The pipeline had been 
pumping 850,000 to 900,000 barrels per day before the explosion. Although 
some 200,000 barrels per day were diverted to underused pipelines running 
through Russia and Georgia, the financial loss over 14 days still came to over 1 
billion dollars.64 The oil that burned, expenses for putting out the fire, personnel 
and repairs cost another 20 million dollars.65 
These economic losses aside, the security of the BTC corridor and 
reliability of Turkey as an alternative supply route again came into 
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question, as in the 1990s. During the invasion of Georgia, the 
Russian army did not destroy the BTC pipeline but some railways 
and trains used for oil transportation were destroyed. The 
interruption of the railways and the sabotage of the pipeline 
temporarily forced Azerbaijan to divert some of its crude oil through 
routes controlled by Russia. In the wake of the Georgian crisis, 
Azerbaijan has become wary of the idea of bypassing Russia 
entirely in energy transportation, as reflected by the cool reception 
U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney received during his latest  visit to 
urge Baku to commit to pipeline routes that would avoid Russian 
territory.66 
If Turkey cannot counter economically and politically costly attacks on 
pipelines in its territory and prevent instability in the surrounding regions, it will 
face enormous consequences. Not willing to incur billion dollar losses in every 
attack, multilateral corporations might explore alternative routes, and seek 
compromise with the PKK to cease its attacks on the pipelines. “As a country 
aspiring to become a major transportation hub connecting Middle Eastern and 
Caspian hydrocarbon reserves to Europe, Turkey will come under pressure to 
ensure security at home and in its neighborhood.”67 Through its diplomatic 
initiatives, such as the proposal for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation 
Platform, it has sought to stabilize relations in the Caucasus region. Likewise, it 
has to restore the credibility of its territory as a secure route, especially given its 
plans to push for the Nabucco pipeline and discussions on the integration of 
trans-Caspian pipelines into the BTC. 
Turkey’s ambitions will paradoxically make it a target of the actors seeking 
to discredit the routes stretching through Turkey. As long as Turkish territory 
remains one of the main theaters of battle over energy transportation, the interest 
in the PKK either from Turkey’s regional competitors or from the West will not 
cease. “The motivations that led the PKK to sabotage the BTC in August are 
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unclear. In any case, this move shows that the PKK closely follows regional 
developments and is in search of new roles and potential supporters.”68 By 
targeting the BTC pipeline, the PKK might have been attempting to find new 
strategic partners. There are grounds to be concerned that the PKK may be 
receiving limited international support, though as of yet no definitive evidence is 
available. This sabotage was the PKK’s first attack on the BTC; interestingly, it 
came on the eve of the crisis in the Caucasus. As the attack broke with the 
movement’s long-standing caution in avoiding alienating Europe and the United 
States, it is possible the PKK may have received guarantees from other potential 
sponsors. Given Russia’s record of limited support for the PKK in the past (such 
as harboring PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan), the August 5 PKK attack on the BTC 
pipeline may have to be analyzed within the context of broader debates on the 
future of energy transportation in the region and Russia’s attempts to solidify its 
dominant position as the major supplier of Caspian and Central Asian energy 
reserves. 
                                            
68 Alex Petersen, “Turkey: The Transatlantic Energy Hub,” Young Professionals in Foreign 
Policy (July 22, 2007), http://www.ypfp.org/ (accessed March 13, 2008). 
 35
III. TURKEY’S OWN ENERGY PROBLEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyze whether or not Turkey ensures its own energy 
security, by comparing criteria regarding various energy resources. The answer 
should provide a clearer view to understanding the real intent of Turkey’s 
policies, which are aimed at making Turkey an energy hub.  
First, the chapter will explain energy security concepts generally accepted 
by many international players. These concepts can be summarized as energy 
diversity and storage. Given the answer to the question of how energy security is 
perceived in countries such as the U.S., EU, China, and Russia, this chapter 
discusses Turkey’s energy security. To determine the amount of Turkey’s energy 
dependency, this chapter will concentrate on consumption and production of 
various “imported” energy resources such as oil and natural gas in the country. 
Then it will emphasize the diversification of energy suppliers and emergency 
policies under an energy crisis.  
B. ENERGY SECURITY AS TURKEY’S OWN SERIOUS PROBLEM 
Since very early times, Energy has been of vital importance in human life 
and is, perhaps, one of the most important factors in economic improvement.  
On the eve of World War I, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston 
Churchill made a historic decision: to shift the power source of the 
British Navy's ships from coal to oil. He intended to make the fleet 
faster than its German counterpart. But the switch also meant that 
the Royal Navy would rely not on coal from Wales but on insecure 
oil supplies from what was then Persia. Energy security thus 
became a question of national strategy. Churchill's answer? "Safety 
and certainty in oil," he said, "lie in variety and variety alone." Since 
Churchill's decision, energy security has repeatedly emerged as an 
issue of great importance, and it is so once again today. But the 
subject now needs to be rethought, for what has been the paradigm 
of energy security for the past three decades is too limited and 
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must be expanded to include many new factors. Moreover, it must 
be recognized that energy security does not stand by itself but is 
lodged in the larger relations among nations and how they interact 
with one another.69 
There has been no exception for Turkey. Until 1970, energy was very 
inexpensive and was easily obtained when compared to today. Moreover, there 
were fewer needs for oil and especially, for natural gas. After the oil crisis of 
1973, this situation dramatically changed and many countries began to confront 
the energy problem. Energy security has been one of the main foreign policy 
issue for many countries. The U.S. in particular implements very active foreign 
policies regarding energy security. The EU also maintains some important 
projects to secure energy for Europe. The IEA (International Energy Agency) 
puts a minimum requirement, such as 90 days of oil stocks, to prevent possible 
effects of an oil crisis for members.70 No doubt, Turkey is a non self-sufficient 
country in respect to oil and natural gas according recent data. The country has 
to import from other countries to meet its growing energy demand. Therefore, 
energy security should be a main problem in Turkey’s energy policies. Due to 
some vital mistakes made by former governments, today Turkey is confronting 
serious problems for natural gas unlike oil. “Turkey has no storage facility for 
natural gas. Turkey has not maintained the minimum 90 days oil stock as a 
necessary condition of the IEA, up to now. Finally, Turkey will encounter serious 
energy security problems if faced with any shortage in oil or natural gas.”71 
C. ENERGY SECURITY TOOLS 
As mentioned in former chapters, energy security can be defined simply 
as the availability of energy sources in sufficient quantities and at reasonable 
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prices at the proper time. Disruption of energy supply may occur at any point in 
the energy supply chain and it can create an extremely dangerous energy crisis 
in a country, in a region or in the whole world.72 For instance, any disruption 
during long winter occurring in Baltic States such as Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania 
could cause mass deaths. The death toll could rise to tens of thousands in 
several weeks.  
There are some specific factors that cause energy supply disruptions: 
• Political reasons: Since energy can be considered as a highly 
political issue, conflicts between energy producing countries and 
energy consuming countries (or energy transit countries) can cause 
supply disruptions. 
• Economic reasons: A sudden increase in energy’s price can lead to 
supply disruption. For example, the last natural gas conflict 
between Ukraine and Russia was based on a disagreement 
between two countries about the price of natural gas. 
• Export restrictions or embargos from producers. For example, the 
oil crisis in 1973 was caused by export restrictions that were made 
by OPEC. 
• War, terrorist attacks or political instability of an energy producing 
country: These factors may disrupt exploration, production, 
processing or transportation of energy. One of the vivid examples is 
terrorist attacks on pipeline infrastructures in Iraq. 
• Natural disasters, accidents or technical reasons: For example, 
hurricane Katrina damaged energy infrastructure and caused some 
disruptions of energy supply in the U.S.73 
D. ENERGY SECURITY POLICIES 
Energy security policies can be examined in two main sections, “short” 
and “long” term policies. The short-term energy security policies can be further 
divided into two main groups: “diversification” and “storage.”  
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• Diversification: The most important policy to ensure security of 
energy supply is the diversification of energy sources, supply 
countries and supply routes. “Since the world economy seems to 
be entirely dependent on oil, other sources like coal and natural gas 
are considered as diversification tools for reducing oil 
dependency.”74 
The U.S. puts very active foreign policies into practice for 
diversification of energy supply countries because of the fact that 
energy security problem is considered as a national security issue. 
Iraq is the main oil suppliers to the U.S. and this seems to be the 
most important reason of Iraqi War. Also European Union has been 
creating some diversification projects to secure energy for Europe 
and in order to satisfy this goal EU formed the INOGATE (Interstate 
Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) program. The Most important 
project of INOGATE is Trans-European Networks Project. This 
project promotes the regional integration of the pipeline systems 
and facilitates the transport of oil and gas from Caspian region to 
the European market. Russia is seen as a good example in that 
respect. As it is known Russia is the largest gas exporter country in 
the world and it tries to diversify its natural gas export pipelines 
routes to reduce its energy export dependency on Ukraine.75 
Ukraine provides the main transit route for Russian natural gas to 
Europe's markets and as of September 2008, 80% of Russian natural gas flows 
through Ukraine to Europe.  
• Storage: The second short term tool for securing on energy supply 
is the storage capacity. After the first oil crisis, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) required some minimum storage regulations 
to minimize effects of an unpredictable rise of oil prices or an 
unexpected disruption of oil supply. The minimum quantity of oil to 
be for stored, what is needed for, is 90 days. Today oil stocks of the 
members of IEA are approximately 4 billion barrels and 1.4 billion of 
these are under the direct control of member governments. The 
rest are in commercial stocks.76 
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Although the IEA has not defined certain minimum requirements of 
gas storage as in the case of oil, those countries who use gas more 
have been establishing some storage facilities inside or outside 
their countries. Storage capacities of some countries for natural gas 
are as follows: Austria (32%), France (26%), Germany (22%), Italy 
(22%)77 
E. BEFORE TURKEY, GLOBAL ACTORS’ POSITION WITH RESPECT TO 
THE ENERGY SECURITY 
1. The European Union 
In European countries, oil and natural gas are acquired from four main 
sources. Those are the following. 
• Middle East Region 
• Russian Federation 
• North Sea (England and Norway) 
• Algeria 
The European Union’s dependence on Russia for oil and natural gas 
constitutes about 40% of its energy imports. Since the beginning of 2000, 
diminishing this ratio is one of the strategic objectives of the European Union. 
The European Union assesses the resources in the Caspian Basin and Central 
Asia as an important alternative in order to cut down dependency on Russia, and 
endeavors to establish “special partnerships and relations” with the countries of 
the region possessing energy resources and with those countries situated along 
the routes of transportation to Europe.78 
In addition to the Middle East and North Africa, the “New Neighborliness 
Policy” of Europe, activated in 2003, is also applied to the South Caucasian  
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region. In this regard, the neighborliness relations established with Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, aim in essence to provide safe and secure access to 
the resources of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia.79 
From the perspective of the European Union, “transporting the energy raw 
materials of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia through a route out of Russian 
Federation” is a geopolitical necessity. 
2. The Russian Federation 
The policies of this country to once again become a global power are well 
known. The oil and natural gas resources of the Russian Federation appear to be 
the most important geopolitical lever in this respect. 
Today, Russia owns 6% of global oil, and 30% of the natural gas. The 
country is completely self-sufficient with respect to energy security.80 
However, it is not clear whether the Russian Federation will follow a policy 
of the following. 
• Mutual trade with consumer countries and organizations respectful 
of the principles of a free market 
• Or, using energy as a “lever of political pressure and blackmail” in 
order to regain its former position as a global power 
• The pressure applied to Ukraine in the beginning of 2007 because 
does natural gas not lead to an optimistic view of the future 
• Additionally, with respect to the arrangements regarding the 
Russian state-owned energy firms such as GAZPROM and 
GAZPROM-NEFT; Russian Federation is preparing itself to use oil 
and natural gas as an effective weapon 
The Caspian Basin countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have 
closely tied themselves to the Russian Federation by signing bilateral treaties of 
                                            
79 “World Energy Outlook,” http://www.allconferences.com/conferences/20080105132408/ 
(accessed December 2, 2008). 
80 Necdet Pamir, “Energy in Security and the Most Recent Lesson: The Russia - Ukraine 
Gas Crisis,” Center for Eurasian Strategis Studies (ASAM), Ankara, Turkey, April 21, 2008, 
www.asam.org.tr/temp/temp111.doc (accessed May 21, 2008). 
 41
natural gas sales in 2000. Thanks to these treaties, the Russian Federation 
transports the gas, which it acquires from the above-mentioned countries with 
quite low prices, and sells it to European countries with high profits.   
3. People’s Republic of China 
The biggest national growth in the global economy is achieved by China. 
The total growth of China in the last 10 years, almost 10% per year exactly, 
draws attention of the international community and the global powers. Currently, 
approximately 25% of the global production of cement and iron is consumed in 
China.81 In the case this country keeps this ratio of growth; in 2020 it will become 
the biggest economy of the world ahead of the United States. In 2030, China will 
require four times more oil and natural gas than it consumes today. This growth 
is also increasing China’s dependency on oil and natural gas imports. China will 
have to supply most of its needs to oil and gas from the Persian Gulf and Middle 
East.82 
The dependency on oil and gas is about to turn out to be an important 
factor determining global geopolitical relations in other consumer countries, and 
the relations between China the Persian Gulf, and Middle Eastern countries as 
well. 
Since the middle of the 1990s, China has signed bilateral and long-term 
treaties with all the important producer countries. China enjoys long-term sales 
agreements with all the producers in Africa and the Middle East. 
For example, the treaty signed with Iran in 2005, which includes the sale 
of the gas in the Yadavaran Region for 100 billion USD to China in the next 25-
year period, attracts attention. Such treaties apparently constitute the main 
reason behind China’s opposition to U.S. policies.  
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F. Turkish Energy Outlook 
Although Turkey is close geographically to rich oil and natural gas 
reserves in the Middle East and Caspian region, Turkey’s proven oil and gas 
reserves seem to be very low. Like many countries, Turkey has large coal and 
lignite resources. However, Turkish coal and lignite have low calorific and high 
pollution values. Thus, Turkey has been importing high quality coal from Russia, 
in addition its enormous natural gas imports from Russia, since early 1990s.83  
Primary energy production of Turkey is insufficient for the Turkey’s 
energy requirements. The quantity of Turkish primary energy 
production was nearly 23,4 mtoe (million tones equivalent) whereas 
consumption was approximately 79 mtoe and the amount of 
imported energy was nearly 55,6 mtoe in 2003. Turkey’s oil 
consumption is 37,7% of total primary energy needs and nearly 
92,5% of it is imported. Also, natural gas provides 22,4% of total 
primary energy demand and 97,4% of it is imported. Turkey needs 
to import gas from other countries in order to satisfy growing energy 
demands. This, eventually, brings Turkey to be entirely dependent 
on imported oil, and natural gas.84 
Turkey’s growing energy requirements give rise to its dependency in 
respect to energy. As time passes, it seems that Turkey’s dependency is respect 
further increasing. For instance, “Turkey’s energy dependency has increased to 
70.1%  in 2003 from  45.8% in 1980. It is forecast that Turkey’s energy 
dependency will reach 76.5% in 2020.”85 
This growing import dependency brings serious problems for a country in 
respect to its costs and imported quantities. For example, the cost of energy 
imports increased from 13.4 billion dollars to 20.5 billion dollars in one year  
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between 2004 and 2005. In other words, the ratio of energy costs to total import 
increased from 14.2% in 2004 to 17.6% in 2005. The main reason behind this is 
the rise in oil prices and changes in the Euro/USD rate.86 
Turkey actually imports coal from various countries and there seems, 
currently, no risk of over-dependency on coal. Crude oil has been coming mainly 
from Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Russia and again Turkey were not seen to be 
overly dependent on any single country.87 But, Turkey has a serious 
diversification problem in respect to natural gas. Actually, Russia seems to be the 
main supplier for Turkey providing 69% of the Turkey’s natural gas consumption 
in 2007. Turkey’s dependency on Russian natural gas will continue to increase 
up to 69.2% in 2020.88 
In order to further improve energy security and reduce the effects of an 
energy crisis, Turkey must prepare strategic reserves for oil and natural gas. 
Unfortunately, Turkey has no efficient policies to reduce the effects of supply 
distribution. For example, Turkey had no storage facility for natural gas nor did, it 
have any storage capacity for crude or processed oil until mid 2007. The National 
Oil and Natural Gas Company of Turkey (TPAO) was actually planning to 
operate the Silivri Underground Gas Storage Facility by mid-2006, but could not 
begin to operate until July, 2007.89 Moreover, the Salt Lake Underground 
Storage Gas Facility is also on the agenda and is planned to be completed by 
2015. 
The World Bank claims the construction of The Salt Lake Underground 
Storage Gas System capacity will reach 6% of the total consumption after the 
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Silivri Underground Gas Storage Facility project. However, it should be noted that 
even this will not be sufficient when Turkey’s long-term goals are considered. 
Turkey should develop new energy policies to promote natural gas storage 
facilities. Although there is no diversification of supply problems for oil Turkey has 
similar storage problem for oil. According to international agreements, Turkey 
should perform to lay away a minimum a 90 day oil stock but there is, actually, no 
completed oil storage facility. There are some problems about establishing 
strategic oil stocks. First, although according to international agreements about 
minimum 90 days oil stock rules, the Petroleum Market Law requires only 20 day  
stockpiling. Also, there are some complicated items about holding stocks as 
crude oil or petroleum products.90 
G. CONCLUSION 
Based on this chapter, it can be concluding that Turkey’s efforts to 
become an energy hub are not a hegemonic endeavor. On the contrary, it is 
simply vital attempts to survive in the future’s energy competition. Moreover, 
Turkey’s efforts are not sufficient. Turkey still has to put in practice additional and 
more effective policies to improve its own energy efficiency. This seems to be too 
fundamental and significant to reduce energy consumption.  
Amid its plans to develop international pipelines, Turkey is coming 
to grips with pressing domestic energy needs. Over the next 
decade Turkey's annual energy consumption is forecast to more 
than double, to the equivalent of 222 million tons of oil, according to 
the Turkish National Committee of the World Energy Council, an 
international energy consortium. At present, the bulk of Turkey's 
demand is met by natural gas, coal, and hydropower. Natural gas 
and coal combustion generate roughly half of the country's 40,000 
megawatts of electricity; oil is another major energy source. 
Hydropower accounts for nearly one-third of the country's power 
generation. Turkish government estimates suggest additional  
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capacity could push hydroelectricity's contribution to 46 percent by 
2020 through the construction of additional plants in Turkey's east 
and southeast.91 
Becoming an energy hub could not guarantee Turkey’s ownenergy 
security. To alleviate the rising trend toward dependency on imported energy 
sources and to satisfy increasing energy demand, Turkey should restructure its 
coal sector and encourage using clean coal technologies that will help improve 
the use of indigenous coal reserves. Only, in such a way, will the production of 
energy and consumption of energy gap be closed down. Otherwise, Turkey will 
live with serious energy security problems in case if it faces any shortage in oil or 
natural gas. Turkey’s goal for storage capacity is ten percentage of annual 
consumption, yet 6% of the total consumption will be nearly 2.4 billion m3. 
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IV. ENERGY SECURITY, THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY 
"The U.S. is an old democracy in a new continent, and Turkey is a new 
democracy in an old continent."92 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The fact that Turkey is an emerging energy hub can be evaluated as an 
opportunity for both United States and Turkey and should contribute to the 
energy security issue as well as regional and global peace.   
Turkey and the U.S. share a sound and deep partnership. They have 
worked together regarding many international issues and problems such as the 
fight against terrorism, illicit trafficking of drugs/weapons/humans, poverty, and 
religious extremism. They share the same values of democracy, human rights, 
law, and liberal market economy. Emergence of new problems and ethnic 
conflicts after the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought these two countries 
even closer. Turkey and the U.S. have been closely cooperating over a wide 
geography, in the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Iraq.93 
It cannot be assumed that U.S. officials have just recently realized the 
potential of the Turkish-U.S. energy security cooperation. Indeed, Marc 
Grossman, vice chairman of The Cohen Group in Washington, DC and former 
ambassador to Turkey 1994-1997, underlined in 2007 that the U.S. should add 
energy to America’s relations with Turkey.  
Americans should pay close attention to the news from 
Turkey…The visit of Turkey’s energy minister to Iran earlier in 
August to sign energy deals, including the establishment of a joint 
Turkish-Iranian company to carry up to 35 billion cubic meters of  
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Iranian natural gas via Turkey to Europe, is a test of America’s 
commitment to bring alternate sources of gas and oil to the world’s 
energy markets. 
One interpretation of Turkey’s desire for closer energy connections 
to Iran is that Ankara no longer believes Washington, distracted by 
Iraq, actively supports what was once a major U.S. objective: 
creating an East-West energy corridor, the network of existing and 
proposed pipelines that bring oil and gas from the Caucasus to the 
West avoiding both Russia’s monopolized pipeline system and the 
crowded sea lanes in the Bosphorus. America runs the risk of 
losing the East-West energy corridor to alternate visions pursued 
by Iran, Russia, and China. 
Tehran has made concessions to Ankara on energy transit 
questions to win Turkey’s cooperation. Russia is meanwhile trying 
to reduce the importance of Turkey as an energy hub by proposing 
that Turkmen gas skirt Turkey. Chinese President Hu Jintao signed 
agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to move oil and 
gas east during his recent visit to the region. Leaders of Russia and 
China and four Central Asian states have just established an 
“energy club,” which does not include the United States. The U.S. 
Administration has tried to stay in the game by financing a new 
feasibility study with Azerbaijan for the construction of two new 
trans-Caspian pipelines, but it will take political and economic 
muscle to make studies reality. 
In 1995, to promote supply alternatives, the United States 
announced support for an oil pipeline that would bring Caspian 
crude from Baku, Azerbaijan to the southern Turkish port of 
Ceyhan. Although some commentators said that the pipeline would 
never be built, they were wrong. In 2006, oil first flowed through the 
pipeline, which now runs through Georgia. With strong U.S. 
backing, diversity of supply became a reality. 
Other important pipelines in Turkey can further contribute to that 
diversity. The South Caucasus pipeline (Baku-Erzurum-Ceyhan) 
began to move gas in July. The Shah Deniz project taps Azeri gas 
fields in the Caspian Sea and then transports the gas across 
Georgia and Turkey. An onward connection will carry this natural 
gas to Greece and Italy. Other lines across Turkey are also 
possible, and perhaps one day, a Turkey-Israel oil or gas pipeline. 
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Strategic foresight requires considering potential military threats to 
this energy supply, since investors want to know that the facilities 
will be secure. While no one can predict the ultimate outcome of the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq, what is certain is that protecting Western 
interests in and around the Middle East will require the presence of 
U.S. forces in the region for years to come. Decisions the 
Administration takes today about force levels in Iraq or arms sales 
to the Gulf can either expand or constrain America’s ability to 
promote these interests, including energy security. Saudi Arabia 
has reportedly begun setting up a 35,000-strong security force to 
protect oil infrastructure from potential attacks. The Turkish airbase 
at Incirlik is near Ceyhan, the end of the 1,760 kilometer BTC 
pipeline; it must be at the heart of any serious Turkish-Western 
thinking about how to be ready to protect the energy corridor. 
Western leaders need to move quickly to renew energy security as 
a foundation for relations with Turkey. This requires more than 
friendly rhetoric and promises. The Turkish public will be skeptical 
of any proposal emanating from Washington, and U.S. policy 
choices about Turkey, including actions in Congress, should be 
made with Western energy security interests in mind. The U.S. 
Administration can gain traction on energy security by taking active 
measures against the PKK, the terrorist group committed to the 
dismemberment of Turkey that operates in Northern Iraq. The 
Administration should not permanently base U.S. forces in the 
Kurdish areas in the north of Iraq, which Turks will see as U.S. 
support for an independent Kurdish state. U.S. leaders must 
convince Turks that they won’t prematurely withdraw from Iraq, 
creating a vacuum that will leave that country in even further 
distress. Europeans should leave the door open to Turkey’s full 
European Union membership.94 
B. TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS AND ENERGY SECURITY 
The nature of the Turkish-American relations during the Cold War era was 
mostly based on defense and security cooperation. Military cooperation was  
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almost exclusively in the form of U.S. security assistance. Turkey found security 
in the Turkish-U.S. partnership and within NATO,95 whereas the U.S. has found a 
reliable ally in the alliance. 
“Although the threat of an all-out war between the superpowers in the post 
Cold War era has decreased dramatically, new and potentially much more 
explosive problems emerged. Among them was a flare-up in ethnic tensions with 
a tendency for violent irredentism which had swept through much of the Balkans 
and the Caucasus with potentially disastrous consequences for the entire 
region.”96 Other asymmetric risks and threats in the form of terrorism, religious 
extremism, rapid population growth of the developing countries, pollution on a 
global scale, racism, xenophobia, and, of course energy security gained ground. 
In line with this change in the nature of global and regional risks and 
challenges, the dynamics of Turkish-U.S. relations have also shifted. A new 
concept called "enhanced partnership" was introduced in 1991. This new concept 
aimed at diversifying and deepening the Turkish-American relationship, as well 
as developing it on a more substantial basis. On the other hand, since 1992, the 
financial value of the security assistance (military and economic) provided by the 
U.S. to Turkey has steadily decreased. Before the Iraq war broke out, Turkey, on 
the one hand, tried to contribute to the solution of the crisis on both bilateral and 
multilateral levels. On the other hand, Turkey entered into negotiations with the 
U.S. on the political, economic and military issues, to eliminate the possible 
negative impacts of a possible war. In accordance with Article 92 of the Turkish 
Constitution, the motion that would have allowed the opening of a northern front 
through Turkey was rejected by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on  
March 1, 2003.97 However, the TGNA has adopted a decision for Turkey to 
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contribute to the war effort as one of the main arteries funneling humanitarian aid 
to Iraq and the realization of the rotation activity of the U.S. troops in Iraq through 
İncirlik airbase.98 
Following the rejection of the motion, to establish a northern front, regular 
contacts and reciprocal high-level visits helped reconsolidate Turkish–U.S. 
friendship and provide the opportunity for both sides to better understand each 
other and the new dynamics guiding and defining the bilateral relationship. The 
two sides reiterated the mutual commitment to extend cooperation further. As a 
result of the efforts to rehabilitate and strengthen the relations, Secretary of State 
Dr. Condoleezza Rice and Minister of Foreign Affairs Gül agreed upon the 
“Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Strategic Partnership” in 
July 2006: 
The relationship between Turkey and the United States is 
characterized by strong bonds of friendship, alliance, mutual trust, 
and a unity of vision. We share the same set of values and ideals in 
our regional and global objectives: the promotion of peace, 
democracy, freedom and prosperity. Thus, Turkey and the United 
States face common challenges and opportunities that demand our 
concerted efforts. These challenges and opportunities form the 
specific items of our common agenda for consultation and 
cooperation. We agree to translate our shared vision into common 
efforts through effective cooperation and structured dialogue. 
Turkey and the United States pledge themselves to work together 
on all issues of common concern, including promoting peace and 
stability in the broader Middle East through democracy; supporting 
international efforts towards a permanent settlement of the Arab-
Israeli  conflict, including international efforts to resolve the  Israeli-
Palestinian conflict on the basis of a two-state solution; fostering 
stability, democracy and prosperity in a unified Iraq; supporting 
diplomatic efforts regarding Iran’s nuclear program including the 
recent P5+1 initiative; contributing to stability, democracy and 
prosperity in the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, Central Asia and 
Afghanistan; supporting the achievement of a just and lasting, 
comprehensive and mutually acceptable settlement of the Cyprus 
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question under the auspices of the UN and in this context ending 
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots; enhancing energy security, 
through diversification of routes and sources including from the 
Caspian basin;  strengthening transatlantic relations and the 
transformation of NATO; countering terrorism, including the fight 
against the PKK and its affiliates; preventing WMD proliferation; 
combating  illegal trafficking of persons, drugs and weapons; 
increasing understanding, respect and tolerance between and 
among religions and cultures; and promoting together effective 
multilateral action to find solutions to international challenges and 
crises of  common concern. The United States strongly supports 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union and the accession 
process now underway. Our consultation and cooperation will also 
include enhanced bilateral relations with particular emphasis on 
economic and commercial relations and investments; 
defense/military cooperation; science and technology and public 
diplomacy efforts and exchanges. Turkey and the United States 
make use of several consultation channels at various levels. It is 
now time to develop a more structured framework to make our 
strategic partnership more effective and results-oriented.99 
This document emphasizes the areas of cooperation on issues of common 
interest that allow structured consultations on those issues. The “Shared Vision 
Document” also calls on the parties to diversify their relations to include 
cooperation in economic, scientific and technological fields, and underlines the 
importance of vital cooperation in energy security issues. After the declaration of 
this document, Turkish-U.S. relations resumed being guided by a road map 
defining the direction and the scope of the bilateral cooperation.100 “In 
accordance with the objectives set in the “Shared Vision” Document, an ‘Action 
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Commission’s Third Meeting, which was held in Turkey on February 8-9, 2007. 
This Action Plan was reviewed and updated during the Commission’s Fourth 
meeting April 16 – 17, 2008 in Washington D.C.”101 
Especially after the recent skyrocketing of crude oil prices, the U.S. further 
continued to improve the basis of the Turkish-U.S. energy security alliance. In 
this context, Rebecca Neff, the First Secretary in the Economic Section of the 
U.S. Embassy in Ankara gave a speech during a meeting on April 22, 2008, 
hosted by STEAM (Strategic, Technical, and Economic Research Center). She 
strongly underlined the mutual importance of the cooperation between Turkey 
and the U.S. concerning energy security issues:  
Perhaps, U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman best captured 
America’s interest in energy security when he said, “the U.S. desire 
to foster global economic growth means the world needs more 
energy.”  The International Energy Agency estimates primary world 
energy needs will grow by 55% by 2030. And, because that will 
make the global energy market just that much more competitive, 
America has an energy policy that centers on the idea that we need 
to diversify our energy sources our energy suppliers and our energy 
supply routes. 
In the Eurasian region, stretching from Brussels to Baghdad to 
Bishkek, the United States seeks open, transparent, market-driven 
development and distribution of energy resources and 
technologies.  We have economic and national security reasons for 
doing so.  The United States and the European Union share the 
largest economic relationship in the world.  Together, we account 
for over half of the world’s GDP.  Our economies are inextricably 
linked, making Europe’s energy supply very important to the United 
States’ economy.  
As President Bush said “energy security and climate change are 
two of the important challenges of our time.”  We take these 
challenges seriously. 
In the United States, we are working to promote cleaner, alternative 
and renewable sources of energy encourage nuclear power 
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expansion invest in science and technology and improve the 
efficiency of our electric power infrastructure.  We are also 
engaging with others to bolster the diversity of supply and demand 
that will accelerate the investments needed for the world’s energy 
security future.  
One of our strongest partners in this endeavor is Turkey.  For over 
a decade, we have shared with Turkey a strategic vision to open 
new energy corridors, to bring new resources market.  One of our 
great success stories is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.  BTC 
added to global energy supplies fostered regional cooperation and 
bolstered the freedom and independence of countries in the region, 
especially the former Soviet states.  Investors made BTC succeed, 
but it happened because governments wanted it to.  Key leaders, 
including former President of the Turkish Republic Suleyman 
Demirel and the late President of Azerbaijan Haydar Aliyev, had a 
vision, and it was not the top-down monopolist way of doing 
business that might otherwise have carried the day – and that some 
still promote.  These forward-looking leaders joined us and others 
in recognizing the value of a market-oriented, transparent and open 
commercial energy architecture.  
Today we are facing new challenges as we work to apply these 
same market principles to develop natural gas from the Caspian 
and Central Asia and bring it to market.  We have made progress.  
In 2007, the South Caucasus gas corridor transported more than 
2.5 billion cubic meters of Azeri gas across Georgia to Turkey.  
Some of this gas transits on to Greece via the inter-connector 
pipeline inaugurated in November of last year by Prime Ministers 
Erdogan and Karamanlis, with the personal support of U.S. Energy 
Secretary Bodman. 
The role of Turkey as a gas consumer, a transit partner and 
possibly as a gas hub, in this era of fast-rising gas demand,  is an 
issue for Turkey to decide.  Some of the key elements that would 
create an efficient gas market – such as a legal and regulatory 
structure that facilitates predictable and transparent delivery of gas; 
or a physical infrastructure that provides large storage capacity to 
weather any disruptions in supply – are also part of the 
infrastructure that would be needed to develop a gas hub. 
And, of course, another important element is sufficient gas supply. 
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Just over the horizon, the most likely near-term addition to regional 
supplies is Phase II development of the Shah Deniz gas field which 
should raise this project’s output to over 20 billion cubic meters by 
2014.  Development of these supplies and markets is the impetus 
for Nabucco, Turkey-Greece-Italy and other pipeline ideas now on 
the table. 
Turning these ideas into reality requires linking suppliers buyers 
financiers and a regime for transport to market.  In this context, 
clarifying the gas transit arrangements between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan could accelerate Shah Deniz Phase II and other much 
needed gas development. 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are key, additional sources of gas.  
President Berdymukhamedov is wisely auditing his country’s 
energy potential as Turkmenistan charts its way forward.  Involving 
major international firms as investors will bring welcome funds, 
expertise and diversity of partners.  Of course, it will also be highly 
desirable for Turkmenistan to have alternative export possibilities.  
The most viable route to market is through Turkey.  Turkmenistan 
and Turkey can also be important partners as Kazakhstan looks to 
diversify its export routes for gas. 
Iraq also has significant gas resources, according to the U.S. 
Energy Information Agency probable gas reserves in Iraq amount 
to over 8 trillion cubic meters.  Energy is an obvious area of 
common interest between Turkey and Iraq and there have already 
been a series of productive talks between the two countries.  The 
United States is facilitating Turkey-Iraq cooperation through a 
trilateral natural gas working group.  Once the legal status of Iraq’s 
hydrocarbon development becomes clear, we expect to see a 
significant jump in Iraqi-Turkish energy cooperation. 
The one country I have not mentioned yet is Iran.  It has the world’s 
second largest natural gas reserves, after Russia.  That would 
normally make Iran a tempting partner for an energy hungry world.  
But this is not the time for “business as usual” with Iran.  Iran 
presents a profound national security threat to the United States 
and all our allies in the region through its pursuit of nuclear 
weapons-related technology and capabilities its defiance of UN 
Security Council obligations and the destabilizing role it plays in the 
region. The goal of the UN Security Council and the wider 
international community, including my government, is to convince 
Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions and urge Tehran to 
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become a better neighbor in the region.   We are committed to a 
diplomatic solution, and we fully support the UNSC’s efforts to  
apply increasing diplomatic and economic pressure to persuade 
Tehran to decide between confrontation and isolation, or 
cooperation and reward.  
We do not seek Iran’s isolation.  On the contrary, since June 2006, 
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – Russia, 
China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States – as well 
as Germany, the so-called P5+1, with full support of the European 
Union, have extended to the Iranian government a generous 
incentives package and we urge Iran to accept it. 
While Iran ponders its options, energy development in the region 
should continue without it.  We should focus our resources and 
investment in those countries that are ready to move forward now 
on the basis of open, market-oriented principles.    
This is an historic time. The world’s rising demand for energy is the 
positive reflection of economic development and prosperity around 
the globe. But its speed and size are straining supplies, 
infrastructure and markets, and there are other problems, such as 
global warming, that directly affect all our energy policies. We know 
markets over time will provide the necessary resources. But 
governments have a critical role to play in facilitating development 
in promoting technologies in making necessary international 
arrangements and in protecting the environment.102 
The United States will continue to work with Turkey, the Caspian, Central 
Asia, the Caucasus, Iraq and other partners in the world to ensure we have the 
energy resources to continue this growth for decades to come.103 
Just before this speech, the Turkey-United States Economic Partnership 
Commission (EPC) met for the fourth time on 16-17 April 2008 in Washington. 
Once again, the closing remarks emphasize the vital Turkish-U.S. energy 
security cooperation, and encouraged further developments, as well. A 
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substantial portion of the EPC dialogue was committed to energy security, 
highlighting the valued energy relationship and addressing shared interests in a 
Southern Corridor and expanded regional cooperation on oil and gas, including 
the Nabucco and Turkey-Greece-Italy pipelines. Turkish and U.S. delegations 
decided to deepen their cooperation and work together to ensure supply security 
for Turkey, as well as the commercially viable transit of gas. Expanding energy 
supply, as well as diversifying sources and routes, is key to helping Turkey and 
Europe satisfy their energy needs. Both delegations agreed on the need for 
enhanced cooperation on nuclear energy, as well. In order to address energy 
security in the most comprehensive manner, the Turkish co-chair suggested 
establishment of a bilateral consultative mechanism on energy.104 
Last, but probably most important, the U.S. Department of Energy 
published a fact sheet on U.S.-Turkey Cooperation in Global Energy Security. 
After all the declarations and speeches mentioned above, this document officially 
indicates an entirely new and effective U.S. course of action regarding the 
bilateral cooperation initiative between Turkey and the U.S. the on energy 
security issue. Because it is a kind of constitution of new mutual implementation 
plan, it should be given here as a whole. 
According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. is 
committed to assisting Turkey with its energy security, as Turkey is 
a key component of a larger regional strategy for increased energy 
production and diversification of oil and gas transit routes.  
The U.S. is collaborating with Turkish partners on the energy 
projects they identify as a priority - for the development, financing 
and insurance of energy projects such as pipelines, power plants 
and electricity distribution systems.  
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In collaboration with Turkish counterparts, the U.S. can work to 
deploy renewable energy and clean coal technologies, increase the 
reliability and efficiency of electricity generation and delivery, and 
decrease Turkey's energy intensity.  
The U.S. is committed to the free flow of Caspian energy 
resources, particularly to western markets. DOE recognizes that 
Turkey can play a key role as a transit corridor between Eurasia 
and Europe.  
The U.S. is ready to provide support for Turkey's energy sector, 
including facilitating investment in generation, transmission, 
renewable energy, nuclear energy and energy efficiency.  
Turkey is in the unique position to enhance its role as an energy 
gateway to Europe. Efficiency gains and a diversified fuel mix for 
electricity generation allow Turkey to maximize the gains due to its 
middle position between demand in Europe and supply in the 
Caspian and central Asia.  
Turkey is an integral part of the DOE southern corridor strategy. 
However, terms and conditions for transit must meet the needs of 
all participants. This is best achieved by establishing standards for 
the entire corridor that will facilitate energy trade and transit, said 
DOE.  
The U.S. wants to establish more efficient and productive financing 
mechanisms to support Turkish energy projects.105 
Moreover, on May 13, 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives submitted 
an important resolution promoting global energy supply security through 
increased cooperation among the United States, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia, by diversifying sources of energy, and implementing certain oil and 
natural gas pipeline projects for the safe and secure transportation of Eurasian 
hydrocarbon resources to world markets. According this resolution, 
The U.S. House of Representatives: 
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(1) commends Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan for 
their positive contributions to the East-West Energy Corridor and 
energy security in the region; 
(2) encourages the Administration to continue to engage with the 
countries in the region and provide political and economic support 
for the projects; 
(3) suggests the Administration should be involved in the facilitation 
of the energy security of transit countries based on usage of the 
East-West Energy Corridor; 
(4) calls on the Administration to use more secretary or high-level 
delegations to increase diplomatic ties with the region; 
(5) supports the newly-appointed Special Envoy for Eurasian 
Energy, and encourages his full engagement with the countries in 
the region, notably Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, and 
Kazakhstan; 
(6) calls on the Administration to actively engage with European 
allies and encourage the European Union to developed a unified 
stance on the Nabucco project and become more involved; 
(7) notes that economic and commercial projects offer greater 
promise than political, military, and institutional structures in 
promoting integration and development in the region; and 
(8) urges the Administration to actively engage in the region in its 
efforts to secure the necessary guarantees for the realization of the 
projects under development, including the Samsun-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline, the Turkmenistan-Trans Caspian-Turkey-Europe Gas 
Pipeline Project, Nabucco, and Turkey-Iraq natural gas pipelines, 
and in this framework, intensify demarches related to Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iraq.106 
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V. CONCLUSION 
It is estimated that the global demand for energy may increase as much 
as 50 percent by 2025, with the demand for electricity rising more than 75 
percent. More than half of this growth is projected to come from the world’s 
emerging economies. In spite of the current economic crisis, the world is 
experiencing positive economic growth even with high oil prices. In order for that 
to continue all nations, need access to safe, affordable, and dependable supplies 
of energy. Because of the robust economic growth around the world especially in 
places like China and India the global demand for energy is expected to increase 
dramatically and at a rapid pace over the next 25 years.   
At the same time, the world is experiencing very tight energy markets, with 
too much of our energy supplies coming from politically troubled parts of the 
world.  Therefore, every nation must come to grips with the need to increase its 
own energy security.  And when they do, they will begin to see that the need to 
increase energy security is not an individual problem that calls more than an 
individual solution. 
To ensure energy security, countries must mitigate the effects of energy 
supply disruptions, expand energy infrastructure, promote a transparent and 
stable investment climate that attracts foreign investors, and advance clean 
energy technologies including renewable energy, clean coal, and emissions free 
nuclear power.  
Turkey plays an important role in helping meet the growing energy 
demands in the region and around the world. The cooperation between the U.S. 
and Turkey furthers that goal. Actually, both sides have offered to collaborate 
more closely on energy security issues. Turkey is poised to be a leader by further 
establishing itself as a gateway between producers and consumers. However in 
order to expand it’s leadership role Turkey must take a more proactive role in 
establishing a market oriented approach that will encourage investment, 
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competition, market pricing, energy efficiency, as well as transparency, stability, 
and reliability. The U.S. government sees Turkey as a strategic ally, a key player 
in the East-West energy corridor, and a lynchpin in getting Russian and Caspian 
energy assets to world markets. Turkey can be a major play in assuring regional 
energy security. However, they must continue to move forward on privatization, 
rule-of-law, transparency, and related issues that must be worked to make that a 
reality. The U.S. also seems to will continue to work with Turkey and encourage 
sustained momentum as they move forward in their development as a secure, 
reliable, transparent and market-oriented transportation hub and a key player in 
the world’s energy markets. The U.S. officials often underline this fact. In this 
context, Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman emphasizes that “Turkey is an 
important energy gateway between the East and the West. Fostering an 
environment that promotes investment opportunities as well as diversity of 
energy supply and suppliers through the global market, in a fair and transparent 
manner, is essential as our two nations work to grow our economies and 
increase energy security.  We look forward to our continued cooperation with 
Turkey, particularly as we exchange ideas and technologies that will help meet 
the world’s growing energy needs in an environmentally responsible way.”107 
It is undeniable that Turkey is evolving into a vital energy transit hub.  
Turkey is an important energy gateway between the East and the West.  The 
United States is, throughout the region, as well as in Turkey, working to enhance 
energy security, increase energy supplies, and diversify energy transportation 
routes.  And the U.S. supports Turkey, which is a strong and dependable ally, in 
its role as a major oil and gas transit route in a market governed by fair and 
transparent rules. 
Turkey has energy needs of its own.  Turkey’s efforts to become an 
energy hub are not a hegemonic endeavor. On the contrary, it is simply vital 
                                            
107 “Joint Press Conference with U.S. Energy Secretary Sam Bodman and Turkish Minister 
of Energy and Natural Resources Hilmi Guler,” 
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attempts to survive in the future’s energy competition. Moreover, Turkey’s efforts 
are not sufficient. Turkey still has to put in practice additional and more effective 
policies to improve its own energy efficiency. This seems to be too fundamental 
and significant to reduce energy consumption.  
In a world of increasing interdependence, energy security will depend 
much on how countries manage their relations with one another, whether 
bilaterally or within multilateral frameworks. That is why energy security will be 
one of the main challenges for U.S. foreign policy in the years ahead. The new 
competition environment requires looking not only around the corner, but also 
beyond the difficulties of cycles to both the reality of an ever more complex and 
integrated global energy system and the relations among the countries that 
participate in it. 
...Yes, to a certain extent the new ‘great game’ has already begun. 
Access to energy is today not only a purely economic but also 
political problem. As long as resources are limited and demand is 
still increasing, consumerist countries should come to an 
agreement before the competition leads to serious tensions.108 
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